Merger Review: How much of industry is affected in an international perspective? by Van Cayseele, Patrick et al.
 Merger Review: How much of Industry is Affected in an 
International Perspective? 
 
 
by 
 
 
Patrick VAN CAYSEELE 
Jozef KONINGS 
Jan DE LOECKER  
 
 
Financial Economics 
 
 
 
Center for Economic Studies 
Discussions Paper Series (DPS) 03.15 
http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ces/discussionpapers/default.htm 
 
 
December 2003 
MERGER REVIEW/ HOWMUCH OF INDUSTRY IS AFFECTED IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE?  
 
by 
 
Patrick VAN CAYSEELE 
Jozef KONINGS 
Jan DE LOECKER 
 
Financial Economics  
 
Center for Economic Studies 
Discussion Paper Series DPS 03.15 
http://www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ew/admin/default.htm  
 
 
December 2003 
 
 
 
 
D/2003/2020/16 
 
* Corresponding author. Centrum voor Economische Studiën, K.U. Leuven, LICOS and Raad voor de 
Mededinging (Belgian Antitrust Authority). (The conclusions and findings in this paper are the 
authors’ responsibility and in no way binding for the Belgian Antitrust Authority) 
° Centrum voor Economische Studiën, K.U. Leuven, LICOS and CEPR 
+ Centrum voor Economische Studiën, K.U. Leuven, LICOS and Harvard University 
Comments by the members of the Leuven Summer Workshop in Industrial Organization are gratefully 
acknowledged. We wish to thank in particular H. Degryse, H. Vandenbussche, F. Verboven and A. 
Xavier for their remarks on an earlier version. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
 2
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The ex ante merger control process that exists at the EC as well as in 
many of the constituting member states is a particular type of government 
intervention, namely one in the market for corporate control. As such, it 
is supposed to correct for a market failure. Here in particular, merging 
firms could gain market power and raise prices at the expense of 
consumers in a way the welfare standard is reduced.1 
 
As with any government intervention, the potential benefits of it can be 
neutralized by government failure. Recently, Duso, Neven and Röller 
(2003) have documented a particular government failure in the area of 
merger control. For the EC practice of merger control and over a 
substantial period of time, they show how the merger control process can 
make type I-errors, that is block pro-competitive mergers which increase 
welfare and growth. Equally, type II-errors can take place, when anti-
competitive mergers which are detrimental to welfare are cleared. The 
authors also identify the causes that may lead a competition authority to 
make errors of type I and II? See also Katsoulacos (2002). 
 
The present paper further documents the costs associated with ex ante 
merger control by focussing on the obligation to notify the merger i.e. to 
go through a merger review process in order to obtain a favourable 
decision by the antitrust auhtorities. The costs of such a notification 
affects both mergers beneficial and detrimental to welfare of the economy 
alike. For the first group, one thus could argue that an error of type I 
occurs nearly always since an operation which improves economic 
efficiency is taxed by the burden of notification, even if it is cleared 
afterwards2. 
 
                                                 
1 Economists over decades have provided estimates of the welfare losses due to monopoly, for a recent 
survey, see Office of Fair Trading (2002). The dead weight loss estimates associated with monopoly 
tend to be substantial, sometimes amounting to several percentages of GDP. 
2 A recent study by Price Waterhouse Coopers, see PWC (2003), documents the costs associated with 
merger reviews. A typical multi-jurisdictional deal on average involves  € 3,3 million external merger 
review costs. To this, one has to add the internal costs, and then one only has the costs to the company. 
For the economy, there are also the costs for the public administration, hearings, legal support, … 
involved in the review. 
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In many cases, merger control excludes the notification of operations for 
which there is prima facie no reason to expect that they will create market 
power and hence need to be scrutinized by the competition authority. This 
helps in keeping the costs associated with merger review in control. 
Usually “small” operations are seen to create no harm.3 
 
Merger notification in addition to welfare considerations has a political 
economy dimension, because the thresholds that trigger the obligation to 
clear in advance are economy wide, but widely different between the 
economies of the EC member states. This implies among other things that 
a merger which needs to be reviewed in order to obtain clearance in one 
country, could go through without notification if the merging firms had 
been located in another member state of the EC. Clearly, this will affect 
the potential for firms to grow by merger and acquisition within a country 
differently. Or a growing firm in one country will be able to get much 
further in his external growth strategy without encountering merger 
scrutiny than a firm in another country. Hence the dynamics of the size 
distribution of firms will be affected differently across countries by 
merger control.4 
 
It could be argued that firms operating in countries with a lower threshold 
will adapt to the domestic situation by growing through cross-border 
merger and acquisition 5. This however assumes that cross-border 
operations are as easy as national mergers and acquisitions. Empirical 
evidence on this points to the contrary: many merger operations are still 
within the boundaries of a country6. Moreover, firms in this way only can 
circumvent the stricter criteria for notification if these do not use triggers 
such as worldwide sales. Otherwise a merger operation with a foreign 
                                                 
3 But this re-opens the door for type II-errors since a merger between two relatively small firms 
operating beyond strong barriers to entry on a particular product or geographic market could do much 
more harm than a merger between larger but contestable firms who need to notify. 
4 See Sutton (1998) for the economic processes determining the dynamics of the size distribution of 
firms. Note also in particular the “Fate of Ilford” when facing actions from the U.K. Antitrust 
Authorities. 
5 The idea that firms will circumvent particular forms of antitrust legislation if other possibilities are 
available has been put forward by Bittlingmayer (1985). He argues that the Sherman Act of 1890 
created such uncertainty about the legality of agreements between firms competing in the same 
industry that they preferred to merge. 
6 The European Commission recently has proposed a guideline to simplify cross-border mergers, 
motivated by the argument that such operations for the moment are virtually impossible in the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Greece, Germany, Finland, Denmark and Austria. 
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firm is in terms of the criteria triggering the merger review process 
exactly the same as an operation with a domestic firm. 
 
In the rest of the paper, we maintain the hypothesis that the most likely 
candidate for a merger or acquisition is another firm operating in the 
same industry in the same country. This is an even more pronounced 
hypothesis regarding the merger and acquisition process since it not only 
considers cross-country but also mergers across industries to be less 
likely. While the latter occur more often than cross-border mergers, they 
are unlikely to trigger merger review, and probably they shouldn’t, for it 
is not evident that market power could result from the merger of firms 
operating in different sectors of the economy7. Under this maintained 
assumption, we show that differences in national thresholds matter in an 
important way for the number of merger operations that are affected by 
merger control regulations. 
 
To show this result, we first provide a brief survey of merger control 
criteria in the EC. As such, we identify classes of comparable countries in 
terms of the different types of criteria used to trigger merger review. In 
the third section, we introduce a framework that determines quantitatively 
the impact of threshold differences within a particular class of countries 
(cluster) using the same qualitative criteria identified in section 2. A 
statistic for the quantitative impact of threshold differences on merger 
notification cases is derived. In section 4, we show how this statistic is 
misleading if the actual size distribution of firms is used to compute the 
percentage numbers of firms actually affected by notification in the event 
of potential merger or acquisition. For a number of manufacturing 
industries in different countries, it turns out that there are important 
differences. In a fifth section, we indicate how countries can be compared 
to each other when they do not belong to the same cluster. Section six 
concludes by offering some reflections on, and extensions of the 
methodology introduced. Also some policy recommendations are made. 
 
 
                                                 
7 There could of course always exist “conglomerate” effects such as enhanced buyer power or 
improved coordination due to multimarket contact, see e.g. Bernheim and Whinston (1990). For the 
purpose of the present paper however, it is noteworthy that some countries even have adapted rules 
saying that such operations should not be reviewed. In Belgium for example, this is called the O+ rule, 
used to indicate that if a company buys another one in a market in which it has no rules yet, it should 
not notify. 
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2. MERGER CONTROL THRESHOLDS IN THE EC: A SURVEY 
 
 
The triggers for merger notification of EC member states as well as other 
European countries are widely different in many respects. First the 
criteria employed are different. Some countries specify turnover on the 
domestic territory as a trigger, other use worldwide sales, market shares, 
or even the size of assets as a yardstick. Second, sometimes a single 
criterion is used while in other countries, many criteria are looked at 
simultaneasly. Finally, the trigger values of the criteria used are largely 
different. 
 
In order to give an idea of the qualitative impact of the merger control 
thresholds and to compare this among countries, it is clear that an 
analytical approach has to be taken8. In the rest of this section, we 
therefore group countries in terms of having similar (qualitatively 
speaking) criteria for notification. In terms of the above paragraph, this 
implies that within a group of countries we will have notification triggers 
that combine the same elements in the same way. A survey of the 
different merger control procedures in terms of criteria used, thresholds to 
be met, a.s.o. is to be found in “Merger Control 2002”, where the 
situation as of 1999 in a number of countries is represented. 
 
A particular class of countries that we can identify is what we call the 
double sales threshold category. In short, the double sales threshold 
category groups countries for which notification is mandatory if a 
combined turnover of y million euro is met and at least two of the parties 
involved each have a turnover of x million euro. 
 
Within the double sales thresholds category, a further distinction can be 
made according to the way one measures the combined turnover. In 
France for example, a combined worldwide turnover of 150 million euro 
is used, whereas in Belgium the criterion is filled in by a combined 
turnover of 40 million euro on the Belgian market. We denote the first 
                                                 
8 An economic analysis of competition policy in general in 4 EC members states has been given by 
Van Cayseele, Van Meerbeeck and Sabatini (2000). 
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group by “double sales threshold/worldwide” and the second by “double 
sales threshold/national”. 
 
Still within the double sales thresholds category, a third cluster of 
countries uses for the combined threshold both sales on the domestic 
market and worldwide sales. This implies that instead of two triggers, a 
third one could lead to merger review. We denote this category by 
“double sales threshold/both”. 
 
Finally, a last cluster of countries can be identified because another 
criterion is added to the double sale threshold. Mostly, countries that 
verify additional criteria on top of the double sales threshold use a market 
share criterion to trigger merger review. We will denote this category by 
“double sales threshold/market share”. 
 
Building upon this, we grouped some European countries according to 
the similarity of the notification criteria used. This leads to the four 
distinct clusters just discussed. Appendix 1 provides the details of the 
countries concerned as well as the particular triggers used. Cluster A 
includes countries such as France and the Netherlands. Cluster B has 
Belgium and Hungary in it. Cluster C includes among others Switzerland 
and the Czech Republic. Finally, cluster D incorporates Greece and 
Spain. 
 
Since the methodology to count potential mergers reviews, to be 
developed in the next section, is designed to deal with data on worldwide 
sales only (as they are made available by the Amadeus dataset), the 
results will be upward biased for all four clusters. Yet, the magnitude of 
the bias differs from cluster to cluster, as will be shown in the fifth 
section 
 
The reason why the methodlogy will yield an upward bias is the 
following. In each group, merger review is triggered by each firm 
participating in the merger having sales of x in the domestic market. 
Since the Amadeus dataset only provides worldwide sales, we use the 
latter whilst verifying whether each party involved in the merger has sales 
exceeding x. The difference between the true trigger value for x and the 
one used for our empirical research thus is exports. Since the latter are 
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nonnegative, the method used will identify more merger review cases 
than those who will actually require merger review. This can best be 
explained by an example. Suppose the algorithm described in more 
formal detail in the next section identifies a couple of French firms with 
resp. worldwide sales of 100 and 55 million euro. Since combined 
worldwide sales are 155 million euro and each individual firm realises 
sales in addition of 15 million euro, the algorithm will count this 
operation as one coming up for merger review. 
 
In reality however, it could well be that the company realizing worldwide 
sales of 55 million euro exports 45 million euro, leaving it with 10 
million of sales on the domestic, French market. In that  case, and 
supposing that the company realizing 100 million euro of worldwide sales 
doesn’t export, we have an operation that does not involve two companies 
each realizing 15 million euro or more on the domestic market, and hence 
it is not subject to merger review. Hence, in the absence of having data on 
domestic sales, working with worldwide sales instead of domestic sales 
will bias our estimate of the number of cases that will need to be cleared 
in an upward fashion. 
 
This implies that even within one and the same cluster of countries, one 
has to be careful in drawing conclusions regarding the impact of the 
different thresholds from the percentage of firms that is affected by 
merger review. The reason is the possibility of an export bias. Only to the 
extent that one assumes that the magnitude of the bias is the same, by 
assuming that firms in particular countries do not export more than their 
counterparts in another country, it is possible to conclude from the results 
of the algorithm that one country is “tougher” than another, when an 
higher percentage of firms needing review shows up. Also, if one is able 
to make a justified assumption regarding the direction of the export bias, 
interesting comparisons can be made. Again two countries in cluster A, 
inz. France and Sweden. The only measurement error that arises in that 
cluster comes from the use of worldwide sales instead of domestic sales 
for the individual sales trigger x. Suppose Sweden exports, as a small 
country relative to France, more.9 In the extreme, suppose France doesn’t 
export at all. Then the algorithm described in the next section, when using 
Amadeus data, as in the fifth section will exactly identify the number of 
                                                 
9 Of course, there can be important sectoral differences in relative exports. 
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merger operations that need review for France, but it will over-estimate 
the number for Sweden, since exports are nonnegative in this country. 
Therefore, should we then find that the percentage of operations affected 
by merger review in a particular industry in Sweden is less than in 
France, its is safe to conclude that French thresholds indeed have a 
stronger impact on that sector. 
 
Along these lines, i.e. by assuming that there either is no export bias, or 
that exports proportionally decrease in country size, it will also be 
possible to propose further orderings, within and even between clusters. 
As argued before, this will be done in the sixth section. For the moment, 
the algorithm used to compute the number of operations affected needs 
explanation. 
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3. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
In this section, we introduce a theoretical framework that illustrates the 
impact of the different merger control thresholds as well as other 
parameters on the percentage number of firms affected by prior 
notification, for a particular cluster, namely A. In order to graphically 
expose the forces at work, we initially assume a uniform distribution 
regarding the size of firms. In reality, the skewness of the size distribution 
of firms will strongly effect outcomes, and hence it is worthwhile to 
contrast this effect with the indicators proposed in this section. First, 
some notation is introduced. Then a graphical illustration which is helpful 
in understanding the algorithm used in the next section is given. Finally 
some indicative statistics are put forward. 
 
 
3.a. Notation 
 
Since we focus on the class of countries which maintain at the individual 
level national thresholds for merger notification, let x denote the 
individual threshold each of the firms needs to have in terms of sales on 
the national territory. The combined sales are denoted by y. These now 
are worldwide sales. Initially we focus on mergers of 2 firms. Finally, 
denote by z the worldwide sales of the largest firm in the industry. 
 
3.b. A Graphical Exposition 
 
Consider all firms in an industry. On the horizontal axis, they are ordered 
from small to large. Since we assume a uniform distribution between 0 
and z, each point on the horizontal axis represents a firm (should the 
population be a continuum). Next, plot exactly the same population on 
the vertical axis. Each point in this plane now represents a merger of two 
firms, but in order to avoid double counting, only the area below the 45 
degree line should be considered.10 Then introduce the merger control 
thresholds. Since only operations including firms each realizing a sales 
volume of x are affected, all operations involving firms to the left of x 
                                                 
10 For merger control purposes, it does not matter whether firm A buys firm B or vice versa. Nor 
whether the operation comes about by a merger of equity or an acquisition, since only sales criteria 
trigger merger review. 
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remain outside merger control. The next threshold involves both parties 
realizing sales together of y or above. This introduces in the graph a 
straight line with slope-1, extending from y on the vertical axis to y on 
the horizontal axis. Finally, the area’s considered are always bound by the 
sales of the largest firm. Therefore, the shaded area in figure 1 below 
represents the number of firms affected, for the case of z>y>2x. (This 
holds for all countries in the class of “double sales thresholds” identified 
in the previous section). 
 
Figure 1: A Graphical Illustration of the Number of Firms Affected in the 
“Double Sales Threshold/National” class 
 
 
3.c. Indicators of the Impact of Merger Controls 
 
As argued in the previous sub-section, the potential merger combinations 
in this industry that are affected by prior control are represented by the 
shaded area. The total of potential mergers simply is represented by the 
area of the triangle with base and height z. As an initial indicator for the 
impact of merger control in an industry with sales of the largest company 
equal to z and operating in a country belonging to the “double sales 
threshold-class”, we propose the ratio of the shaded area and z2/2. 
Formally, let P represent the percentage number of firms affected, then it 
is easy to show that: 
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A few conclusions result from analyzing how the different parameters 
effect P. Clearly, P increases in the sales of the largest firm in the 
industry. It decreases both in the combined and individual sales threshold. 
Whenever the individual and combined thresholds are 0, p = 1 and all 
firms are affected. This all is quite intuitive. 
 
As x, y and z determine P, and as countries have different thresholds, the 
P’s will be different in each country. But moreover, the P’s will be 
different for each industry within a country as z differs across industries. 
Since the size distribution of firms tend to be particularly skew in the 
tails, see Sutton (1998), we may expect large differences in P across 
industries within the same country. This illustrates a first effect of the 
skewness of the size distribution of firms which is usually missed in the 
political economy debate on thresholds. 
 
Another aspect related to the skewness – which will be illustrated more 
forcefully in the next section – has to do with the shape of the distribution 
assumed. For the moment, results are derived for a uniform density of 
firms having sales between 0 and z. In reality, many more firms will be 
small and only few will be larger. This implies that the area used to 
represent the number of potential merger cases that need to be cleared is a 
biased indicator. Indeed, above y, the number of combinations actually 
occurring will be much more infrequent than the area used until now. 
This implies that P is an upper bound for the true statistic, or that in 
reality, P will be lower. More important however is that the magnitude of 
the bias increases in y. 
 
3.d. Export Bias 
 
As explained extensively in the previous section, the Amadeus data set 
provides us with worldwide sales while one threshold of the countries 
grouped in cluster A denotes domestic sales, viz. at the level of the 
individual sales criterion x. This implies that the more a country is export 
oriented, the more the algorithm identifies operations that need to be 
reviewed while in reality they don’t. In figure 1, on both the horizontal 
and vertical axis, one finds both domestic and worldwide sales. But since 
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the data set used only provides worldwide sales, domestic sales have been 
omitted. Worldwide sale however also include exports, hence when 
worldwide sales data are used to cut off the part of the distribution of 
firms that needs to notify, whereas domestic data should be used, too few 
cases will be identified as not needing merger review. But than the 
domestic sales threshold represented by an horizontal line in figure 1, in 
fact should be above the horizontal line at the level of x. This clearly 
shows how the algorithm, making use of worldwide rather than domestic 
sales identifies too much cases for review. 
 
3.e. Summing up 
 
The present section has introduced a statistic P for indicating percentage-
wise how much of industry is affected by merger review. This statistic 
clearly shows the importance of the level of the thresholds x and y, as 
well as the impact of the support of the size distribution of firms z. The 
statistic is an upper bound for the true number of cases that while need 
review for two different reasons. First of all, the skewness in the size 
distribution of firms implies that less merger combinations exist with 
large firms, as opposed to what the statistic P will indicate due to the 
uniform distribution of firm size that underlies it. When working with the 
real data however, the numerical algorithm that is presented in the next 
section is not affected by the skewness of the size distribution (as 
opposed to the uniform distribution assumed) because the algorithm 
actually counts all the potential cases that would need a review. 
 
A second bias comes from working with Amadeus data, and hence 
worldwide sales, while one criterion involves domestic sales. This will 
lead to an overestimation of the cases identified as being affected, and 
this bias is not corrected by the numerical algorithm used in the next 
section for it is inherent to the data used. 
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4. THE IMPACT OF EX ANTE MERGER REVIEW: THE 
DIFFERENT TRIGGER VALUES AT WORK WITHIN EACH 
CLUSTER 
 
 
In this section, we actually compute the percentage of firms affected by 
merger control for a number of manufacturing sectors in a selected 
number of countries. This is done by applying the algorithm described in 
appendix 2 on the Amadeus data set, for a selected number of countries. 
We start with the countries in cluster A, that is France (F) and Sweden 
(S).11 See table 1 for the results. 
 
A few interesting conclusions emerge. The most striking are the 
sometimes very substantial differences between countries for one and the 
same industry, as well as the substantial differences between industries in 
one and the same country. Commenting upon the differences between 
countries first, and abstracting from industries in which a particular 
country has a 0-entry (this could be explained either by zero percent 
affected or by the country not having any serious activity in that country), 
we see how for: NACE 15 (Manufacture of Food and Beverages), NACE 
27 (Manufacture of Basic Models), NACE 29 (Manufacture of Machinery 
and Equipment, NACE 32 (Manufacture of Radio, Television, 
Communication), NACE 34 (Manufacture of Motor Vehicles), NACE 35 
(Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment), France tends to have 
percentage-wise more of industry affected by merger review than 
Sweden. Given the assumption that for a given level of worldwide sales 
in France and Sweden, this results in more domestic sales in France and 
less in Sweden, the algorithm tends to be biased against Sweden in that it 
takes too many operations as being affected there.12  
 
 
                                                 
11 Due to the very bad quality of the data in Amadeus for the Netherlands, it doesn’t make sense to 
include that country into the analysis. 
12 Especially for NACE 29, NACE 32 and NACE 34, there could be “obvious” cases of overcounting 
for Sweden given the resp. strong export position of players such as ABB, B&O, Volvo and Saab. 
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Table 1: Percentage of potential merger cases needing prior notification for manufacturing industries 
in countries of cluster A 
 
Nace Industry F S 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages  0,09 0,01 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 16,66 0,00 
17 Manufacture of textiles 0,03 0,00 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel 0,01 0,00 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather 0,02 0,00 
20 Manufacture of wood and wood products  0,00 0,00 
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products  
0,79 0,89 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction all 
media 
0,00 0,00 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petrol and 
nuclear 
12,46 0,00 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products  
2,55 0,00 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  0,13 0,00 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products  
0,07 0,00 
27 Manufacture of basic metals  1,96 0,42 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products  0,00 0,00 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 0,08 0,01 
30 Manufacture of office machinery & computers 0,67 0,00 
31 Manufacture of electric machinery 0,21 0,00 
32 Manufacture of radio, television, 
communication 
0,31 0,26 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision & optical 0,02 0,00 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles 1,00 0,33 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0,26 0,03 
36 Manufacture of furniture 0,01 0,00 
37 Recycling 0,00 0,00 
Median  0,09 0,00 
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Hence, it is safe to conclude that in those sectors, the French thresholds 
for merger notification are tougher in that they affect percentage wise 
more of industry. Overall France seems to be have tougher triggers than 
Sweden.13 
 
Next, within each of the countries, pronounced differences exist between 
different industries. For France, the manufacture of tobacco products 
(NACE 16) and the manufacture of coke, refined petrol and nuclear fuel 
(NACE 23) is percentage wise much more affected than say the 
manufacture of furniture (NACE 36). This clearly illustrates how 
economy-wide thresholds are always to affect industries with strong 
economies of scale (also notice the “intermediate”-percentages of 
chemicals (NACE 24) and basic metals (NACE 27)) more than those who 
not have such scale economies.14 
 
Using the same methodology of tracing the nature of the bias, we can 
engage in country comparisons within other clusters too. In cluster B, we 
have Belgium (B) and Hungary (H). For this  cluster, the algorithm will be 
even more biased since both the individual and combined thresholds are 
in domestic sales whereas the algorithm uses worldwide sales. Between 
these countries, it seems that Belgium is more export oriented, given the 
relative state of development of the two economies and their geographic 
position. Therefore it seems safe to conclude that should we find an 
Hungarian industry that is percentage wise more affected than its Belgian 
counterpart, Hungary has the tougher regulatory standard for the Belgian 
percentage will even be more overestimated. 
 
In table 2, it shows that this seems to be the case for a number of 
industries, namely15: NACE 15 (Manufacture of Food and Beverages), 
NACE 16 (Manufacture of tobacco products), NACE 18 (Manufacture of 
wearing apparel), NACE 20 (Manufacture of wood and wood products), 
NACE 21 (Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products), NACE 22 
(Publishing, printing and reproduction), NACE 28 (Manufacture of 
fabricated metal products), NACE 30 (Manufacture of office Machinery 
and computers), NACE 31 (Manufacture of electric machinery), NACE 
32 (Manufacture of radio, television, communication), NACE 33 
(Manufacture of medical, precision and optical), NACE 34 (Manufacture 
                                                 
13 The Swedish Authority on the other hand has a strong tradition in fighting cartels, see 
Konkurrensverket (2001). 
14 Of course, strong scale economies will imply fewer players being able to reach the minimum 
efficient sale and hence fewer competitors. 
15 Again, zero percenatges have been left out of the comparison because this could point to the activity 
not being undertaken. 
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of motor vehicles), NACE 35 (Manufacture of other transport 
equipment), NACE 36 (Manufacture of furniture), NACE 37 (Recycling). 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of potential merger cases needing prior notification for manufacturing industries 
in countries of cluster B 
 
Nace Industry B H 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages  3,55 17,75 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 35,95 100,00 
17 Manufacture of textiles 3,71 2,18 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel 0,43 2,92 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather 0,62 0,00 
20 Manufacture of wood and wood products  0,37 1,69 
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products  
8,24 10,13 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction all 
media 
0,75 12,59 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petrol and 
nuclear 
41,18 37,14 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products 
19,23 10,17 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  5,82 2,97 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products  
1,54 0,00 
27 Manufacture of basic metals  17,28 9,52 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products  0,52 3,34 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 2,64 2,72 
30 Manufacture of office machinery & computers 0,95 12,46 
31 Manufacture of electric machinery 3,65 12,22 
32 Manufacture of radio, television, 
communication 
7,21 17,48 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision & optical 0,86 15,93 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles 8,92 10,24 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 1,96 14,28 
36 Manufacture of furniture 0,85 6,45 
37 Recycling 0,54 0,00 
Median  2,64 10,13 
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This is a rather long list, indicating that Hungary has rather tough merger 
review enforcement standards. To judge on Belgium, a comparison with 
another developed economy should be made. This is deferred to the next 
section. 
 
Also in this cluster, pronounced differences exist between different 
industries. For Belgium, as in France, the manufacture of tobacco 
products (NACE 16) and the manufacture of coke, refined petrol and 
nuclear full (NACE 23) is strongly affected, but so are the manufacture of 
chemicals and chemical products (NACE 24) and the manufacture of 
basic metals (NACE 27). The just mentioned comparison with another 
developed economy therefore is more than justified. 
 
Finally, a comparison of the countries within cluster C can be made, for 
within cluster D we only have been able to compute the results for Spain. 
Countries in cluster C are as any other country upward biased in terms of 
the percentages of merger operations that need review due to the use of 
worldwide instead of domestic sales. But compared to countries in cluster 
A or B, another criterion is added, in the form of an “or” condition. More 
in particular, these countries have an individual sales threshold at the 
domestic level, and two combined thresholds: one using domestic sales, 
another using worldwide sales. Since the algorithm only looks at 
individual worldwide (instead of domestic) and combined worldwide 
sales, one trigger (combined domestic sales) is ignored, leading to 
possible underestimation. 
 
Within the cluster however, it again is plausible to assume that more 
exports will lead to a relative overestimation, and hence that Switzerland 
being more advanced will in reality probably have fewer cases than 
estimated. This again implies that if we find a percentage for Switzerland 
(CH) below that of the Czech Republic (CR), we will conclude that the 
last countries regulations are tougher for that particular industry. 
 
Again as becomes clear from table 3, this happens in very many cases. 
The list here tends to be as long as that for Hungary (compared to 
Belgium). We only mention the codes of the industries, viz. NACE 15, 
NACE 16, NACE 21, NACE 22, NACE 24, NACE 25, NACE 26, NACE 
28, NACE 29, NACE 32, NACE 34 and NACE 35. This leads to the 
conclusion that also this transition country tends to have low trigger 
values for merger review.16 
                                                 
16 The question of course is: how tough is the review process once it has been triggered? 
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Table 3: Percentage of potential merger cases needing prior notification for manufacturing industries 
in countries of cluster C 
 
Nace Industry CR CH 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages  29,8 15,82 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 100,00 71,42 
17 Manufacture of textiles 19,24 0,00 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel 2,85 0,00 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather 13,33 0,00 
20 Manufacture of wood and wood products  8,85 0,00 
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products  
31,88 14,00 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction all 
media 
4,72 0,89 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petrol and 
nuclear 
100,00 0,00 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products  
24,95 15,96 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  10,94 1,17 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products  
23,57 3,29 
27 Manufacture of basic metals  40,90 0,00 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products  8,32 2,66 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 11,62 10,03 
30 Manufacture of office machinery & computers 0,00 0,00 
31 Manufacture of electric machinery 8,13 12,92 
32 Manufacture of radio, television, 
communication 
7,69 4,76 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision & optical 5,07 6,83 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles 38,38 16,67 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 29,42 6,67 
36 Manufacture of furniture 8,91 0,00 
37 Recycling 0,00 0,00 
Median  11,62 2,66 
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5. THE IMPACT OF EX ANTE MERGER REVIEW: A COMAPRISON 
BEWTEEN CLUSTERS 
 
 
It is easy to see that clusters C and D are using the same triggers as 
cluster B, but add an addit ional criterion that triggers review. Therefore, 
if we compare countries similar in exports (hence controlling for the 
export bias overestimation) in the B cluster to countries in the C and D 
cluster, it is clear that a lower percentage of merger operations affected in 
the B cluster points to tougher standards in the countries belonging to the 
C or D cluster. As such, when we for example assume that Belgium and 
Switzerland have about the same export bias, Switzerland is tougher than 
Belgium for NACE 15 (Manufacture of food and beverages), NACE 16 
(Manufacture of tobacco products), NACE 21 (Manufacture of pulp, 
paper and paper products), NACE 26 (Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products), NACE 27 (Manufacture of basic metals), NACE 28 
(Manufacture of fabricated metal products), NACE 29 (Manufacture of 
machinery and equipment), NACE 31 (Manufacture of electrical 
machinery), NACE 33 (Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments), NACE 34 (Manufacture of motor vehicles) and NACE 35 
(Manufacture of other transport equipment). 
 
Again this is a long list indicating that Belgian thresholds are rather high 
although they induce on an extremely low budget antitrust authority a 
tremendous work load. 
 
Comparing Hungary (from cluster B) to the Czech Republic (from cluster 
C) is an equally interesting exercise. Since the Czech Republic adds a 
criterion that is not checked by the algorithm (or to put it differently 
checks two criteria that are different by computing only one test), it tends 
to underestimate the percentage of cases affected for this country. Hence 
if we find a lower percentage in Hungary, we again may conclude that the 
latter has a soften standard, assuming the export bias is the same to the 
two countries. Again a long list of sectors for which this holds true can be 
given. Hungary tends to have soften standards than the Czech Republic 
for NACE 15, NACE 17, NACE 20, NACE 21, NACE 23, NACE 24, 
NACE 25, NACE 27, NACE 28, NACE 29, NACE 34, NACE 35 and 
NACE 36. A few sectors in which the reverse situation might prevail 
however also exist. A comparison between Belgium or Hungary and 
Spain, the only country from cluster D for which we could do 
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computations seems less relevant due to the very different economies 
induced. Methodologically speaking, an higher percentage for Spain 
would lead us to the conclusion that Spain is tougher, for we miss cases 
by not taking into account the fact that the market share threshold might 
be reached. 
 
Other comparisons between countries belonging to different clusters can 
be done in the same spirits. Cluster C can be seen as cluster A with an 
addition al criterion, allowing also comparisons between e.g. Switzerland 
and Sweden. A smaller percentage of operations affected for Sweden 
would then lead to the conclusions that Swedish standards are weaker for 
that industry. Such an exercise would show that this indeed holds for 
NACE 15, NACE 21, NACE 29, NACE 31, NACE 32, NACE 33, NACE 
34 and NACE 35. Each of these sectors (except NACE 26 for which 
Switzerland cannot be compared to Sweden for we detected not any 
significant activity of it in Sweden), was also in the list of countries for 
which we argued there was a reasonable indication that Switzerland was 
tougher than Belgium, hence it is safe to conclude that Switzerland is a 
rather tough country for these sectors. 
 
The most interesting comparison however seems to be between countries 
in cluster A and B. More in particular then between Belgium, France and 
Sweden. As argued already, although Belgium asks for a combined sales 
thresholds in terms of domestic sales, we use worldwide sales instead. 
Also, in terms of openness, this country seems to export on average more 
than Sweden or France. Hence the algorithm will overestimate the 
percentage of merger operations affected by merger review most for this 
country and hence if we find an higher percentage for France or Sweden, 
we may conclude that Belgium has softer standards. 
 
Nonetheless, comparing industries in Belgium vis-à-vis France and 
Sweden yields the conclusion that there is no single sector where Belgian 
regulatory standards are softer than those in France or Sweden. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The present paper has investigated the impact of the different criteria 
used to determine whether or not a merger should be cleared in advance. 
We have documented the implications of such a prior notification 
regulation in terms of the percentage number of potential merger cases 
affected. As could be expected, since the criteria in a country hold for all 
industries involved, substantial cross industry variation emerges. 
However, as the criteria used differ between countries, the latter 
generically impose different burdens upon the private sectors plans for 
growth by domestic mergers or acquisition. 
 
In order to show the above results, a number of assumptions had to be 
made, and hence limitations are around. Future research should in this 
context certainly proceed by using exact domestic sales rather than 
approximating them by worldwide sales to determine the impact of the 
individual sales trigger. 
 
Cross-country comparisons yield many interesting conclusions. While 
there may be individual sectors who do not follow the pattern described 
below, it nonetheless seems to be the case that: 
 
- transition countries tend to have low trigger values, implying many 
cases needing review; 
- Hungary tends to review less than the Czech Republic; 
- developed countries such as Belgium, Sweden and France do not 
seem to review many cases, but 
- Switzerland seems to.17 
 
Since we have indicated that all these conclusions simply are based on 
biased estimates, few policy conclusions, especially regarding toughness 
standards between countries, can be drawn for the moment. The “order” 
of toughness indicated in this contribution however is a good first 
indication of the impact of the different merger criteria used. Mostly if 
not always, these are determined “ad hoc”. Hence, this first contribution 
should “trigger” an academic discussion regarding the determination of 
the criteria for merger review, in view of a “fair level playing field” for 
industry willing to grow by merger and acquisition. 
                                                 
17 Again it is important to stress that this contribution has focussed on the number of cases that come up 
for review. The next stage is how many cases that actually have been blocked and here wide 
differences between countries exist too. Switzerland for example has 0% for the ratio 
prohibited/examined, whereas Belgium has 1,6% and France even 4,6%, see Katsoulacos (2002). 
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Appendix 1 Clusters of Countries following Qualitatively the Same/Similar Criteria for Notification. Situation anno 1999. 
 
Cluster A “Individual Domestic Sales and Combined Worldwide Sales Threshold” 
Cluster B “Individual Domestic Sales and Combined Domestic Sales Threshold” 
Cluster C “Individual Domestic with both a Domestic and Worldwide Combined Sales Threshold” 
Cluster D “Individual Domestic with Combined Worldwide Sales and Market Shares” 
 
 Country x CDy  CWy  m 
 
 France € 15 million - € 150 million - 
A The Netherlands € …. - € …. - 
 Sweden SEK 100 million _ SEK 4 billion - 
 
 Belgium € 15 million € 40 million _ _ 
B Hungary USD 200.000 USD 40 million _ _ 
 
C Czeck Republic  K 200 million K 550 million K 5 billion _ 
 Switzerland SF 100 million SF 500 million SF 2 billion _ 
 
 Spain 10 billion Ptas 40 billion Ptas _ 25% 
D Israel USD 2,6 million USD 35,5 million _ 50% 
 Greece € 15 million € 150 million _ 35% 
 
where x denotes sales on the domestic market, CDy  is combined sales on the domestic market, CWy  is combined sales 
worldwide and m denotes the market share of the merged entity. 
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